During the last few decades, and for reasons not entirely clear (some even suspect such as the redefinition of diseases according to the medications available in the market), in cases of cancer pathologists have been asked more frequently to evaluate the prognosis of (to "grade") neoplasms on the basis of the histological characteristics of tumors. The "grading systems" are more and more elaborate, proliferate everywhere, occupying an ever-growing part of textbooks. This even goes to the point where diseases tend to be defined by their prognosis. It is not rare to find in the literature state- prognosis. For instance, it is worse to suffer from small-cell carcinoma of the lung than from basal-cell carcinoma of the skin. One is therefore justified in communicating to a patient the prognosis associated with his disease. It is even correct to specify the prognosis by specifying the diagnosis in terms cogent, for instance, by typing and sub-typing tumors according to solid morphological basis, but prognosis nevertheless remains a (more or less) likely statement concerning the future of a population of patients, whereas diagnosis must remain a sure fact concerning the present of an individual patient. The patient dying from metastatic basal-cell carcinoma does not care for a minute that he had a 99.99% chance of survival when the rare patient surviving 10 years with small-cell carcinoma of the lung has had these years spoiled by the constant threat implied that he had a 90% chance of dying as a result of his disease. And to all other patients, that information is useless.
The only conceivable usefulness of prognosis is to calibre the aggressiveness of therapy: "bad" cancers are worth being treated more aggressively than "good" cancers. To this end the prognosis implied by a precise diagnosis should suffice.
Other aspects of the misunderstanding of prognosis by clinicians are illustrated well by the two following examples:
(1) We have seen a patient surviving 30 years with metastatic melanoma or small-cell carcinoma of the lung, who refuses to believe the diagnosis even after the slides had been reviewed and the diagnosis confirmed. Outcome was inconsistent with the diagnosis according to them and therefore the diagnosis must have been wrong. This is nonsense. Delusion. No individual outcome is inconsistent. The chance of winning a lottery may be very low, but can you imagine a winner being told that the fact that he won meant that it was not a lottery to which he participated?
(2) We have seen patients who thought they were cured and told by their doctor that "one never is cured from cancer" with devastating consequences. Delusion once again! Some patients are cured from even the worst cancers. In every case, moreover, the fundamental diktat of medicine, primum non nocere, must be respected; "information" such as "one never is cured from cancer" simply violates it.
The third delusion afflicts the pathologist, and it is enough to make one paranoid. It is not sufficient anymore for him to make a correct diagnosis. He must now also report thickness in hundredths of millimetre, grades histological and/or cytological on scales of 3, 5 and even 10, distances of margins in fractions of a millimetre, mitotic activity, percentages of tissue affected by cancer in a biopsy, presence of ulceration, necrosis, apoptotic rates, etc. And with all these "prognostic factors" added to it, his "diagnosis" soon fills two pages! Afraid of missing some "important prognostic factor" he Examples are numerous of the noxious consequences that result from confounding diagnosis and prognosis: It is the favorable prognosis of melanoma in situ that for years has impaired the recognition of its being melanoma; it is the "indolent clinical behavior" of small plaque parapsoriasis that continues to impair the recognition of its being mycosis fungoides; it is "outcome" of spitzoid melanoma metastatic to lymph node that purportedly justifies the flawed concept of "metastatic Spitz nevus"; it is purported indolent biologic behavior that constitutes the raison d'être of "small and medium cell cutaneous T-cell lymphoma" as an entity different from mycosis fungoides, etc.
In short, defining disease according to prognosis is a delusion. No clinician is satisfied by a "likely diagnosis" and no pathologist should accept entities defined by prognosis, a "judgment of the likely or expected development of a dis-
This is the first of four delusions hidden behind "prediction of outcome." It concerns the very understanding of diseases and affects the students of them.
The second delusion concerns the clinician and can be stated thus: informing a patient of his "individual prognosis" reveals a total misunderstanding of the nature of a prognosis-it being a statistical value and therefore applicable only to a population of patients.
It is perfectly true that various tumors have various prognoses and that any diagnosis comes with its associated
After all, if it is legitimate for a suffering person to ask "what will happen to me?" it is just as legitimate for a healthy person to ask, "What are my chances of getting sick?" And when experts pretend to have answered the first question, it is only a matter of time before they become tempted to answer the second, acquiring the power to cure diseases even before they occur! Ultimately this transforms risks into diseases and makes everybody sick! After all, isn't life the ultimate risk in itself, the ultimate "disease" from which everybody shall die?
Without entirely discrediting "evaluation and treatment of risks," we wish to stress here the dark sides of it that can take delusional proportions. First, the apparent benefits of such an approach may appear as positive as to hinder any critic of it. Second, these same benefits apparently may induce, in a very delusional manner, denial of the side effects of "treating risks." Third, economical interests generated by treating a huge number of healthy persons may create massive incentive in favour of possibly useless or even harmful "risk therapy." Fourth, patients refusing to have their risks evaluated may be refused insurability or, worse, be brought to feel guilty for their insouciance [1] .
In short, a diagnosis certain must remain the cornerstone of therapy; prognosis in individual case is of little, if any, utility to a clinician and may, in many ways, be harmful to patients. Pathologists therefore should concentrate exclusively on the diagnosis and forget about the prognosis if they want to avoid, as modern haruspices, being the laughing stock of future generations.
forgets to concentrate on diagnosis. After a while it becomes necessary for him to take refuge in the no man's land of "dysplasia" and other "entities of unknown or indeterminate significance" and, compiling data for "predicting outcome," he becomes something like a haruspex, this diviner of antiquity whose function was to predict, for the benefit of the Emperor (the clinician), the issue of a battle by reading in the viscerae of a sacrificed animal (the patient) (Figure 1 ).
Poor pathologist caught in such a cruel trap of being mocked! The fourth delusion is induced in patients when, as a result of the first three delusions already described, they are informed of "their" prognosis. It may take various forms. For instance, a "good" prognosis may induce reassurance, perhaps even euphoria, only to be deceived later by facts whereas a "bad" prognosis if not inducing depression or despair, may spoil the duration of survival. More importantly perhaps, a subtle form of delusion is created in the mind of patients through a drift from "prediction of outcome" for diseased individuals to "evaluation of risks" for healthy persons. 
